http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A107997.PDF
THE PEOPLE v. JOSEPH PIERRE ROLLIN
1
Filed 12/13/06 P. v. Rollin CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH PIERRE ROLLIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
A107997
(Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR031321)
Joseph Pierre Rollin appeals his conviction for abuse of a dependent adult. We
reverse because a statement obtained in violation of the rule announced in Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 was admitted at trial as evidence of his guilt, and the error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Decedent Joi Wright lived with defendant in a run-down mobile home in Orick,
California. In late August or early September 2000, she was visited by Michael
Finamore, an adult protective services public health nurse with Humboldt County.
Wright suffered from multiple sclerosis, was bed and wheelchair-bound, and was also
incontinent. She had some minor bed sores, and Finamore arranged for her to receive
health care services. The county also contracted with defendant to act as Wright’s
caregiver. Wright was then coherent and articulate, and considered competent to make
decisions.
Pg 2
In November 2000, defendant told Finamore he wanted Wright to leave, and
Finamore arranged for her to move to Eureka, with in-home support services. She
remained in Eureka until the end of March 2001, when she moved back to Orick to be
with defendant, against Finamore’s advice.
In October 2001, home care support services to Wright were terminated after
defendant reportedly said he had a gun and would blow the social worker’s head off if he
saw her again.1 Finamore last visited Wright at defendant’s trailer in November 2001 to
check on her and discuss closure of her adult protective services’ case. She was clean
and coherent, and was not concerned that the home health service had “disenrolled” her.
She did not appear to be in any pain or discomfort. Finamore had some concerns about
the volatility of defendant’s personality, but thought defendant “always tried hard and did
an adequate job in providing care for [Wright].”
In January 2002, a deputy sheriff went to the trailer after he received a call from
Wright’s mother asking him to check on her welfare, and he returned in February after he
received another call reporting that Wright’s phone had been disconnected. Wright said
she was fine, was excited about a pending move to New Mexico, and wanted her mother
to leave her alone.
On March 11, 2002, a friend of defendant’s visited the trailer. He noticed a putrid
smell, and heard a sarcastic-sounding female voice say something like: “Are they here?
Did they bring it? Help, help. I’m dying here. Come on. What’s taking so long? . . .
Bring me my stuff.” Defendant told his friend he had been working really hard taking
care of Wright and was not in any big rush to assist her.
On March 20, 2002, defendant’s brother brought Wright’s emaciated and soiled
body to the hospital. She had been dead for hours. Her catheter had not been changed...
footnote: (1 Defendant denied he had a gun, and claimed he was just blowing off steam. A
social worker who visited Wright at defendant’s request several times between April and
July 2001 testified Wright was sometimes afraid of defendant, but that she would rather
die than go to a nursing home. The social worker’s visits were discontinued, apparently
at defendant’s direction.)
PG 3
...for an extended period of time, and the most serious of numerous bedsores extended to
the bone.2 Her primary cause of death was bronchial pneumonia, caused by fecal
contamination of her bedsores or by a urinary tract infection. She was malnourished,
possibly because of a lack of food or due to her multiple sclerosis.
A criminal complaint was filed against defendant on March 19, 2003. On April 8,
2003, defendant was arrested in Austin, Texas. Christine Cook, the senior investigator
for the Humboldt County District Attorney’s Office, went there to interview him about
Wright’s death. Defendant made a series of statements to police. Most were recorded. 3
At first, defendant claimed he was out of town when Wright died in a motel where his
brother had taken her. Later, after receiving Miranda warnings, defendant admitted he
was present when she died. He ultimately told Cook that Wright choked and died in her
sleep. Defendant claimed he fed Wright every day. He said her bedsores were beyond
his control and her catheter needed attention, but Wright refused to let him take her to the
hospital. After she died, defendant’s brother cleaned up the mobile home and took
defendant to Oregon and then Arizona, where he stayed with a relative.
Defendant was charged with dependent adult abuse, with allegations that he
proximately caused the death of the victim and personally inflicted great bodily injury.
The court concluded defendant’s taped statements to police did not result from
interrogation, and denied defendant’s motion to exclude them. They were played to the
jury. The jury convicted defendant as charged. He was sentenced to eight years in
prison, including the midterm of three years for abuse of a dependent adult, a five-year
consecutive enhancement for proximately causing the victim’s death, and a three-year
concurrent enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. He timely
appealed.
(footnote: 2 On March 13, 2001, a urologist treating Wright for a urinary tract infection and
incontinence surgically inserted a catheter that needed to be changed every four to six
weeks. He last saw her in November 2001.
3 Further details relating to defendant’s statements are included in the discussion
portion of this opinion.)
PG 4
DISCUSSION
“The scope of our review of [claims alleging Miranda violations] is well
established. We must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences,
and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.]
However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those
properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally
obtained.” (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263.)
“The prophylactic requirements of Miranda, supra, are familiar. In order to assure
protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under ‘inherently
coercive’ circumstances, a suspect may not be subjected to an interrogation in official
‘custody’ unless he has previously been advised of, and has knowingly and intelligently
waived, his rights to silence, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel if he
is indigent. . . . Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible to
establish his guilt.” (People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 271.)
“[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. . . . A
practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation.” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)
446 U.S. 291, 300-302, fns. omitted.) 4
It is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he spoke with Cook in Texas.
He was transported in handcuffs from the county jail to an interview room at a police...
(Footnote: 4 An “incriminating response” includes “any response—whether inculpatory or
exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.” (Rhode Island v. Innis,
supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301, fn. 5.) Nor is the intent of the police irrelevant, “for it may
well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions
were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.” (Id. at pp. 301-302, fn. 7.)
Pg 5
...station. When the interview began at the police station, Cook identified herself, and told
defendant she was there “to talk to him about Joi” and to “find out what happened to
Jo[i]—how she died.” Cook then told defendant she was interested in an earlier comment
defendant made to a police officer during the trip from the jail that she understood to
imply that Joi died from choking. Defendant told Cook that was correct, and proceeded
to talk for approximately 20 minutes about his relationship with Joi and the
circumstances of her death. When an officer interrupted the interview to see if defendant
wanted more coffee, Cook left the room and advised defendant of his rights when she
returned. During defendant’s 20 minute monologue, Cook repeatedly nodded her head,
made affirmative sounds in response to defendant’s statements, and occasionally took
notes. From defendant’s perspective, Cook’s conduct must reasonably be viewed as
likely to elicit an incriminating response and is the functional equivalent of express
questioning.5
In People v. Harris (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 640, Division Four of this District
concluded the functional equivalent of interrogation occurred as described in Rhode
Island v. Innis when a police officer remarked to a defendant who had declined to talk
with him: “ ‘ “I thought you were going to come back and straighten it out.” ’ ”6 (Harris, supra, at pp. 646, 648-649.) The court concluded the officer’s remark “must be deemed the ‘functional equivalent’ of further questioning,” because the officer “should
have known his remark was likely to draw damaging statements from appellant.” (Id. at...
(Footnote: 5 After Cook read defendant his rights, he continued to talk and deny he was with
Wright when she died. After a break, Cook told defendant his brother was in custody and
had told a different story. When he was accused of not telling the truth, defendant asked
for an attorney, and the interview ended. But defendant kept talking while Cook
accompanied him back to the county jail. Cook told him she could not talk to him after
he invoked his rights. She obtained a second waiver and made an audiotape recording of
defendant’s remaining statements. Defendant then admitted that he, and not his brother,
was with Wright when she died.
6 The officer was apparently referring to an earlier telephone conversation when
defendant, who had left town, agreed to return. (People v. Harris, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 644-645.)
Pg 6
pp. 648-649; see also People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 274-275 [after defendant
invoked his right to counsel, a police officer invited him to make an incriminating
response when the officer “advised, in effect, that defendant was still under suspicion and
that investigation of his involvement would continue”].) A similar conclusion is
warranted here.
Cook should have known that her words and conduct were “reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response” from defendant. (See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446
U.S. at pp. 301-302.) She told defendant she was in Texas to interview him and get
information from him about Wright’s death. She accompanied him from the county jail
to an interview room at a police station equipped with recording devices. She expressed
a specific interest in defendant’s earlier comment that Joi choked to death, effectively
inviting him to respond and thereby increasing the likelihood that he would incriminate
himself by speaking about her death.
The Attorney General now argues that Cook was waiting for him to “ ‘come up for
air’ ” to read him his rights, but our review of the videotape of the interview indicates
Cook never attempted to interject until defendant had spoken for about 20 minutes. Cook
had 15 years of experience as an investigator, 25 years as a peace officer, and had
attended “many years of training regarding interviewing and interrogation techniques.”
The fact that she did not ask defendant explicit questions does not end our inquiry
regarding whether there has been a Miranda violation. (See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra,
446 U.S. at p. 299, fn. 3 [“To limit the ambit of Miranda to express questioning would
‘place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect
interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda.’ ”].) Cook should
have known her comments were likely to draw damaging statements from defendant, and
should have given him Miranda warnings at the beginning of the interview. (See People
v. Harris, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 648-649; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at
p. 302.)
The Attorney General concedes that the cases relied upon by the trial court are
factually distinguishable. (See People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 337-338 [no...
Pg 7
...interrogation occurred when an imprisoned defendant, evidently motivated by a religious
conversion, contacted prison authorities to discuss his crimes in another state]; People v.
Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985-986 [police officer had no reason to know that his casual
estimate of possible penalties, in answer to the defendant’s question during their ride to
the hospital, would produce an incriminating response, and the record instead
“demonstrate[d the] defendant’s desire to unburden himself by confessing the murder”].)
The same is true of the cases cited in the respondent’s brief on appeal. (See, e.g., People
v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 290, 302 [officer’s brief statement informing defendant
about the evidence against him at the time of his arrest was not likely to elicit an
incriminating response]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 814-816 [deputy’s
affirmative response when defendant asked if he could light a cigarette, which preceded
defendant’s volunteered confession, did not constitute interrogation].)
Nor do we agree with the Attorney General that the introduction of defendant’s
unwarned statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because defendant denied
culpability. (Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301, fn. 5 [“If a statement
made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecution.”].) The jury watched the entire videotape of defendant’s interview at the
police station, when he denied being with Wright at the time of her death. The jury also
heard the audiotape of defendant’s later statement in the patrol car, when he admitted he
was with her when she died at the motel. The contradictions between defendant’s earlier
and later statements to Cook formed the basis of the prosecutor’s repeated arguments to
the jury that discrepancies in his statements should be considered as circumstantial
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The court also instructed the jury: “If you find that before
the trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement
concerning a crime for which he’s now being tried, you may consider that statement as a
circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt.” The jury deliberated over
several days, and heard evidence that Wright refused medical treatment and that her
malnourishment could have been caused by her multiple sclerosis. The evidence of
defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming. We cannot conclude that the admission of...
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...defendant’s statement obtained in violation of Miranda was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt even in light of his statements made after he received Miranda
warnings.7 (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Hinman v. McCarthy (9th
Cir. 1982) 676 F.2d 343, 352.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
_________________________
Siggins, J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.
7 Because we reverse on the Miranda issue, we do not address defendant’s
additional allegations of error with regard to the jury instructions and sentencing.
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