This is Mickey Fleschner's letter to the McKinleyville Press describing Paul's appearance at a Trinidad
Chamber of Commerce dinner... This is where he was talking about the Brian Schooling case....
Tuesday, February 10, 2004
District Attorney's judgement questioned
Dear Editor,
Mr. Paul Gallegos attended the Jan. 20, 2004, Trinidad Chamber of Commerce dinner meeting as the guest speaker. In his comments Mr. Gallegos had outlined his vision of law enforcement, which placed emphasis on integration with social services in the rehabilitation rather than routine criminal prosecutions and reflexive incarceration of those convicted. During the course of the question and answer session following his informative presentation, and exchange of revelatory importance took place.
Mr. Dick Bruce, a chamber member, asked a question to the effect; "Is it appropriate for the District Attorney to perform social service functions when we already have schools, other social service agencies and the Sheriff?" Mr. Gallegoos, in his response, decided to use an example to explicate his progressive approach to duties as District Attorney. He referenced a pending case in sufficient detail for us to understand the defendant's identity, After defining for us a psychological condition called "multiple personality disorder," he paused to make these admonitions:
He presumed that none of us in the audience was in the "jury pool" of potential jurors in the case.
He cautioned us that we should not talk widely about this matter, hoping we would keep this example amongst ourselves.
He advised us that any of us called as jurors in this case would have to recuse ourselves form jury duty.
Resuming his analysis, Mr. Gallegos explained that this defendant had three different personalities. The first was that of a severely abused toddler, the second (I'm a little hazy on this one) of a neglected child through adolescence, and the third of a properly functioning adult. Mr. Gallegos, in all seriousness, rhetorically asked us to advise him which one of the personalities he should prosecute?
This example he offered to an informal gathering of about 45 citizens to illustrate the broader understanding of social issues he brings to the office of District Attorney. He recognized from the onset that speaking of such things was impacting the jury pool. Continuing with his psychoanalysis of the defendant after such recognition is not poor judgement, it is a lack of a fundamental capacity to make judgements requisite of a District Attorney.
Though I supported Terry Farmer in the last election, I did not support the recall petition of Mr. Gallegos. Mr. Gallegos made it clear in his campaign that he was a reformer of traditional "tough on crime" law enforcement. He won the election and I thought Humboldt County should suffer or benefit from the consequences of giving his approach a try. However, his Jan. 20 performance has nothing to do with a more enlightened approach to law enforcement. It demonstrates an appalling deep seated lack of judgement. Had I experienced this earlier, I would have supported the Recall petition.
Sincerely,
Mickey Fleschner
Trinidad
3 comments:
This case has become an issue in the 2010 election campaign:
http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CCA%5C2002%5C20020827_0007884.CA.htm/qx
[U] People v. Schooling
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com
Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com
August 27, 2002
THE PEOPLE, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
BRIAN C. SCHOOLING, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
(Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. 991295)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Marchiano, P.J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
Appellant Brian C. Schooling pled guilty to felony child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and inflicting corporal injury on a child (Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a)), and admitted causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7). He entered his pleas with the understanding that the trial court would issue a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5) to permit him to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress interrogation statements he claimed were involuntary.
Appellant now contends he pled under an illusory promise, because his right to appeal the suppression ruling was waived by the entry of his guilty pleas. The Attorney General agrees and concedes error. We accept the concession and reverse.
I. FACTS
We need not discuss the substantive facts of appellant's offenses. Appellant was charged by information with one count each of child abuse and inflicting corporal injury on a child. Each count bore a great bodily injury enhancement. At the outset of trial he filed a motion in limine to suppress incriminating statements he made during his interrogation by a deputy sheriff. Appellant claimed the statements were involuntary. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. Appellant then pled guilty to the charges and admitted the great bodily injury allegations, under the express promise that the trial court would "issue a certificate of probable cause upon sentencing . . . to allow [appellant] to appeal the Court's ruling that [the] motion to suppress his confession ha[d] been denied." The court accepted the guilty pleas based on appellant's understanding that his right to seek appellate review of the ruling would be preserved.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the promise to preserve his right to appeal the ruling was illusory because his guilty pleas, by operation of law, waived his right to appeal. Appellant is correct. The Attorney General agrees, referring us to People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889 (DeVaughn). DeVaughn holds that an order denying a motion to suppress a confession as involuntary cannot be reviewed on appeal after the defendant enters a plea of guilty, and that the trial court "could not bargain" to preserve appellate review by issuing a certificate of probable cause. (18 Cal.3d at pp. 893; see id. at pp. 895-896.)
We are of course bound by DeVaughn. We must conclude that appellant entered his pleas under an illusory promise of nonexistent appellate review of a critical ruling against him, and that his pleas must be set aside. The Attorney General has conceded the error, waives oral argument, and represents to us that "the judgment must be reversed and [appellant's] plea[s] set aside."
III. DISPOSITION
Based on the concession of error and controlling precedent, the judgment is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate appellant's guilty pleas and proceed further on the information.
We concur:
Swager, J.
Margulies, J.
20020827
© 2002 VersusLaw Inc.; Pat. Pending
Link:
http://ca.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.%5CCA%5C2002%5C20020827_0007884.CA.htm/qx
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvzOSOSl8_I&feature=player_embedded
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